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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME XXIV MARC-, 1936 NUMBER 3
ALIMONY AFTER A DECREE OF DIVORCE RENDERED
ON CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE
By ROBERT B. HABWOOD*
With the spectacle of several states competing for 'divorce
business', and its accompanying flow of outside gold, the ques-
tion of alimony after a decree of divorce rendered on construc-
tive service assumes a prominence greater than at any time
since the birth of ex parte divorces in American jurisprudence
a few years more than a century ago.
In England, prior to 1858, jurisdiction over matrimonial
causes was in the Ecclesiastical Courts, and divorces a mensca
et tMoro only were granted by these courts. In proceedings for
divorce in the Ecclesiastical Courts, by Canon Law, and later by
statute, no person could be cited out of his own diocese, so
ex parte divorces were impossible. The only question dealt with
by these courts analagous to alimony was in providing support
for the wife living separate and apart from the husband by
judicial decree.
The Ecclesiastical Courts were deprived of their jurisdic-
tion over marital causes by the Act of August 28th, 1857 (20
and 21 Vict. C. 28), said act becoming operative in 1858. The
jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts over marital causes,
with the additional power of granting divorces a vinculo matri-
rwnzii was conferred on a court created by the Act, commonly
called the Divorce Court.
Prior to that date (1858), complete severance of the marital
tie could be obtained in England only by a special act of Parlia-
ment, or what is commonly called a legislative divorce, and ali-
mony was never granted with such divorces. Then too, such
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama; A. B. 1922;
LL. B. 1926, University of Alabama; LL. M. 1932, Harvard University;
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procedure was hedged with limitations and difficulties, making
relief from this source .impossible for most people.' Today, in
England, not only is the Divorce Court clothed with power to
grant divorces a vi2nu/o, with alimony, but under circumstances
to grant divorces in ex parte proceedings. 2  However, for the
purposes of this paper, the situation in England concerning the
granting of divorces and alimony will be of interest only in the
period prior to the creation of courts of equity in this country,
and the conferring upon these courts, by statute, jurisdiction
over marital causes. For although new provisions were incor-
porated in these early statutes as to the powers of the newly
created equity courts over marital causes, giving them power to
decree divorces a vinculo, and to award alimony, these statutes
were nevertheless construed in connection with the law upon
the subject brought to this country from England, e. g. the law
of the Ecclesiastical Courts.
Since alimony accompanying a divorce a vinculo was un-
known in England at the time of the creation of the Equity
Courts in this country, the statutes in the American states con-
ferring power on these courts to grant divorces a vinculo, and
to award alimony, created a situation incompatible with the
English law upon the subject, and it was in attempting to in-
terpret these statutes by the standards of the English law upon
the subject at that time that created for the courts in this coun-
try their greatest difficulty.
Our courts were not burdened with the technical objec-
tions to granting ex parte divorces that faced the Ecclesiastical
Courts, and the Common Law contained principles by which
such a remedy could be worked out, so there fell to our courts
the task of formulating and applying these principles. 3 From
Bishop 4 we gather that the first ex parte divorce granted in the
"And there was no divorce court in 1800. At the commencement
of the century, the marriage bond could be severed by nothing less
than an act of Parliament. That is still, I believe, the law of Ireland,
which is still without a divorce court. And before asking for an act
of Parliament, the injured husband was required, first, to sue the
adulterer at law and obtain a verdict against him for damages, and
then to take proceedings in an ecclesiastical court for a decree of
divorce a mensa et tlhoro. When he had succeeded in these two courts,
he might commence his application to Parliament. In other words
only a very wealthy man could obtain a divorce in England in 1800."
Pound--"Readings on the History of the Common Law", p. 147.
'Matrimonial Causes Rules 1924, Rule 9.
3Bishop: Mar. Div. and Sep., Vol. 2, Sees. 134, 135.
' Ibid., Sec. 145.
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United States was in 1832, in the Maine case of Harding vs.
Alden,5 wherein the court granted the divorce even though tha
service attempted to be made on the husband in North Carolina
was defective. The law concerning ex parte divorces developed
meagrely for twenty years after the Maine decision, until the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island threw a great light on the
question in that splendid opinion written in the case of Ditson
vs. Ditson.6 The Ditson case apparently furnished the necessary
ferment, and the doctrine of ex parte divorces expanded rapidly
in this country, and cases involving petitions for alimony after
the rendition of such decrees began to appear in the reports.
The decisions have been far less uniform than their some-
what limited number would have indicated, due apparently to
a lack of a thorough understanding of the history of the law
of divorce and alimony, and also to a decided tendency of the
courts to use one of classical jurisprudential approaches solely,
to the exclusion of the other methods of approach.
The cases fall entirely too neatly into one or the other
of the groups recognized by the student of jurisprudence, de-
pending on whether the judge deciding the case belonged to
the historical, analytical, or philosophical school. These divi-
sions are strikingly illustrated by the cases bearing on the
problem under discussion, and there are a few recent cases in-
dicating that the courts may adopt the developing sociological
approach to this question, which approach, because of its indi-
vidualization of each case, should prove most effective in han-
dling a question of this sort.
The question as to whether the wife may obtain alimony
in a subsequent proceeding instituted after an ex parte divorce
seems to fall naturally into four divisions:
1. Where the wife obtains the divorce, and alimony is awarded
in a later proceeding.
The cases coming within this group show very markedly
that a metaphysical criteria of justice to the wife, that is, of
giving to the wife what the court thought in justice she should
have, was the determing factor of the decisions. The historical
background of divorce and alimony, and a strict analysis of the
a 29 Greenl. 140.
64 R. I. 87.
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statute conferring jurisdiction over marital causes in the court
takes second place to equity and intuition.
An outstanding case falling within this group, and one
that is often referred to in decisions subsequent to its rendition,
is Spradling vs. Spradling,7 an Oklahoma case decided in 1919.
In this case the wife had obtained an ex parte divorce in Ken-
tucky, suing later for alimony in Oklahoma, where the husband
had then established his domicile. In allowing the wife ali-
mony the court said: "The very gist of the present action is
the enforcement of the natural and legal duty of a man to
support his former wife and children of his marriage although
the marital tie has been severed for his fault in a former action
in which the performance of such duty could not be compelled."
A large number of cases are cited and commented upon by the
court in the course of the opinion, though an examination of
some of these cases, Turner vs. Turner,8 Adams vs. Abbott,9
Rogers vs. Rogers,1 0 and Wright vs. Wright," will prove disap-
pointing, for there is little in these cases that offers much aid
in assisting a court to arrive at a correct solution of the problem
that confronted the court in the Spradling case, so while one
might agree with the solution reached, the treatment of the ma-
terial and technique of its application is disappointing.
Under similar facts, and writing to the same point, the Utah
Court, in Hulton vs. Dodge,12 said, "It would be a travesty on
justice and a sad commentary upon the power of 3udicial tri-
bunals generally if the courts were powerless to grant relief in
a case of this kind, where the jurisdiction of the defendant is
174 Okla. 276.
8 In the Turner case, 44 Ala. 437, the court merely retained juris-
diction first acquired, although another state subsequently acquiringjurisdiction awarded a decree before the Alabama court heard the
case.
921 Wash. 29. Careful reading of this case shows that alimony
was refused in the lower court, and that the lower court's decision
was affirmed. The higher court, in its opinion, used misleading lan-
guage which read alone would lead one to believe that alimony was
allowed.
1* 54 Ky. 364. The question involved in this case was the recogni-
tion of a foreign judgment for alimony awarded improperly in an Ohio
court, after a divorce obtained in Kentucky, at which the wife was
present and contested the suit.
'-24 Mich. 180. In this case a statute affecting the question was
the deciding factor, whereas no such statute was present in the Sprad-
ling case.
1258 Utah 228.
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afterwards seasonably obtained and the rights of third parties
have not intervened."
The method of the Utah court in its handling of this ques-
tion in Hulton vs. Dodge'3 is certainly the more satisfactory.
After dismissing the attempted reservation of the question of
alimony as being beyond the power of the court awarding the
decree on constructive service only, the court decided the ques-
tion entirely on its own moral merits, and did not attempt to
strengthen its decision by a lengthy review of authorities of
doubtful application, yet arrived at the same conclusion reached
by the Oklahoma court in the Spradling case.
The courts in some instances have allowed their chivalrous
instincts to carry them to great lengths in their efforts to see
that the quondamnL wife is the recipient of what their conception
of justice and equity demands that she obtain, and which she
was prevented from receiving in the proceeding wherein the
decree of divorce was granted, due to the operation of the Due
Process clause of the Constitution and the necessity of construc-
tive service in that proceeding.
The most extravagant example of this type of quasi charity
is to be seen in two Illinois cases Karcher vs. Karcher,14 and
Darnell vs. Darne.1. 5  The Illinois courts will not allow ali-
mony subsequent to a decree of divorce, unless the right to
award alimony later is specifically reserved in the decree grant-
ing the divorce.16 In the Karcher case it was held that this
reservation could be made even in cases where service of process
was constructive, and the court admittedly had no jurisdiction
to award alimony, and further, that the court would award ali-
mony to the wife upon obtaining jurisdiction of the husband,
if such reservation had been made. However this decision
seems mild when compared with the Darnell case, supra, for
at least in the Karcher case the reservation made use of had
been made by an Illinois court, whereas in the Darnell case the
court made use of a reservation to award alimony contained
in the ex parte decree rendered by a court of another state on
which to base its right to entertain the wife's petition for all-
Note 12, supra.
11 204 Il. 210.
212 Ill. App. 601.
Lennahand vs. O'Keefe, 107 Ill. 620.
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mony.17 Unblushingly, the Illinois court allowed the wife to
obtain alimony in the DarneIt case, supra, after she had located
her husband in Chicago, saying: "Since the Minnesota court
had no power to award alimony, and since the question was
expressly reserved to the courts of this State, or for any court
obtaining jurisdiction of the question, the question of alimony
was in no way determined. . . We think that the fact that
the decree was entered in Minnesota should make no difference."
To say the least, it would have made entertaining reading had
the court gone further and attempted to explain just why it
made no difference that the decree had been entered in Min-
nesota.
The fallacy of the above reasoning is at once apparent, but
it is so clearly and succinctly put by an Iowa court, speaking in
a case in which the facts were practically on all fours with the
facts in the DRrneU case, that I will simply quote an excerpt
from that opinion. The Iowa court said:18 "So in the case at
bar, the court was without jurisdiction to make any award on
the subject of alimony in the original proceeding, and no juris-
diction, by attachment or otherwise, of any property of the
appellant. It could make no valid order respecting alimony.
The cause proceeded to final decree. Such decree, when so
entered, was binding on both parties. If the court had no juris-
diction in the original proceeding to make any binding award
of alimony, it necessarily and logically must follow that the
court had no jurisdiction in rendering the final decree in said
cause to make any order respecting the subject of alimony, by
continuance of said cause as to said subject matter, or reserva-
tion of the question. It could not reserve jurisdiction of a
question of which it did not have jurisdiction."
In fairness it should be said that the Illinois courts are
particular in requiring that it be clear that a reservation to
award alimony at a later date was actually made by the court
rendering the decree, for in one case the court refused to per-
" In the Darnell case, supra note 15, the wife had obtained a decree
for divorce in Minnesota, constructive service being obtained on the
husband, who at the time was confined in Leavenworth Prison, in
Kansas. The Minnesota court awarded the wife a divorce, and custody
of the child of the marriage. The decree further averred that no
alimony was awarded, but the question was specifically reserved for
the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, or such other court as should
have jurisdiction.
Doeksen v. Doeksen (Iowa), 210 N. W. 545.
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mit an attempted award of alimony, in a proceeding where the
service of process was constructive, to suffice as a reservation of
the question of alimony at a later date. 19
It has been held that the fact that the wife accepted ali-
mony out of property situated in the state granting the divorce
on constructive service, will not estop her from a later proceed-
ing in the domicile of the husband for additional alimony, where
it clearly appears that in the divorce proceedings the court did
not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of real estate then
owned by the husband in other jurisdictions, and could not,
without consent of the parties, consider the same in fixing the
amount of alimony.20 It appears to this writer that this de-
cision is correct, for if a jurisdiction is going to allow the former
wife to recover alimony in a later proceeding, there is no reason
at hand to prevent that jurisdiction, under the above facts,
from augmenting the amount of alimony the wife was able to
obtain, where her ability in the jurisdiction awarding the decree
was limited to the amount of the property of the respondent's
then actually in the state.
2. Where the wife obtains the divorce, and alimony is refused
in a later proceeding.
Historically, and probably analytically, the cases refusing
the wife alimony, after she has been the one to obtain the di-
vorce, are more accurate than the philosophical, metaphysically
inclined, cases that allow the wife to obtain alimony under such
circumstances.
The greatest fault to be found with this group of cases is
that they are too prone to look at form, to the exclusion of sub-
stance. This is especially true when the formalism goes to the
extent of denying the wife the right to alimony because she
"voluntarily" obtained the divorce decree, and should thereby,
and for that reason, be estopped from asserting her claim to
sustenance at a subsequent time. This is mentioned as a reason
for denying alimony in several cases.21 The effect is to penalize
the wife for exercising a right which in many cases she has no
other choice than to exercise, as a practical matter. It is prob-
'Kelley v. Kelley, 233 Ill. App. 203.
2 Bodie v. Bates, 95 Nebr. 757.
2 McCoy v. McCoy, 191 Iowa 973; Darby v. Darby, 151 Tenn. 287;
McFarland v. McFarland, 43 Ore. 978.
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ably correct to say that only in the rarest of instances is any
divorce proceeding voluntary, or rather the voluntary act of the
party instituting the proceeding. Such an action is in reality
the result of the acts of both parties, and can be said to be the
voluntary act of' the complainant only to the extent that the
proceedings were instituted by him or her. Certainly where
the wife has been abandoned, or abused to the extent of giving
her a just cause for divorce, it is unfair to her to say that she
"voluntarily" obtained the divorce, and for this reason should be
denied a claim for maintenance due to her from the husband,
who could not be made to perform this duty by the court grant-
ing the divorce merely because he was out of its jurisdiction.
The historical, or the analytical approach, or the two in
combination, are chiefly used by the courts that refuse the wife
alimony where she has been the one to obtain the divorce on
constructive service.
In a proceeding in Arkansas under such circumstances, 22 in
1867, the coiqrt stated that Arkansas does not recognize the in-
herent right of a court of chancery to award alimony, and that
therefore it must be guided by the terms of the Arkansas statute
on divorce, which the court proceeded to construe to mean that
alimony could be awarded only at the time of the granting of
the divorce. The question of res judicata was not discussed,
nor were the historical elements involved in the problem given
much attention. The decision was produced largely by a tech-
nical analysis of the statute. It so happened in this case that
the wife had married a second time, the second husband being
dead at the time of the action for alimony. This led the court
to remark that if the wife were allowed to obtain alimony from
her first husband now, she could have obtained it during her
second marriage, which would have brought about the situation
of the second husband joining his wife in alimony proceedings
against the first husband for her support.23
2 Bowman v. Worthington, 24 Ark. 522.
2 If this was said seriously by the court it overlooked the essential
basis of alimony, sustenance and support for the wife, and for this of
course, the second husband would have been responsible during the
life of the second marriage. It would have been easier for the court
to have invoked the doctrine of laches in this case, since a long num-
ber of years had elapsed between the time of the divorce and the filing
of the suit for alimony.
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One case within this group attempted to posit the right of
the wife to alimony squarely on whether the husband, or the
wife, secured the ex parte divorce, allowing it if the husband
had been the one to institute the proceeding, and denying it if
the wife had.24 The theory of this case was that where the
husband secured the ex parte divorce the proceedings were in
fraud of the wife's right of maintenance and support, while
refusal under ,the latter circumstance was because the relation
of the husband and wife being dissolved, there was no longer
any legal obligation on the t~art of the husband to provide for
his wife's maintenance. Logically, the reasoning in the latter
case fits either situation about as well. This case was later over-
ruled,2 5 and the wife can now secure alimony in that jurisdiction
regardless of whether the ex parte proceedings were instituted
by her, or her former husband.
This idea of no legal duty toward the wife after the rendi-
tion of the divorce decree has been carried to such an extreme
by one court that it refused to allow the wife in her own name,
and in behalf of the minor child of the marriage, to obtain an
order, or judgment, requiring the former husband to pay alimony
to her, in order to support the child whose custody had been
awarded her in the divorce decree. The wife was left to an
original action to recover of the father of the child, her former
husband, the amount of the expenditures made by her after the
divorce, for the proper maintenance of the child, whose support
was legally due from the father.26
The court of one state blandly announced that the wife de-
prived herself of the right to alimony by obtaining the divorce,
which was based on constructive service on the husband, for, if
alimony in addition to the decree of divorce was desired she
could have brought her suit for divorce against the husband in
the state of his residence, and had him served personally with
process, and could then have asserted her right to alimony.2 7
This alternative so generously offered the wife is a shallow,
and for many practical reasons, a non-existent right. In the
first place, the absent spouse must be located, and secondly,
'1 Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Nebr. 613.
2 Bodie v. Bates, 62 Nebr. 613.
"Hall v. Hall, 141 Ga. 361.
2Darby v. Darby, note 21, supra.
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many states have required periods of residence as a condition
to obtaining divorces in their tribunals. Granting that these
difficulties be met it might still be well nigh impossible, as a
practical matter, for the -wife to pursue her suit in a foreign
and perhaps distant jurisdiction.
The true reason underlying the decisions falling within this
group is that the rendition of the divorce decree is res judicata
of all questions relating to alimony, because of these court's con-
ception of the inseparability of alimony from divorce. Illus-
trative of this view is the language of the Iowa court in McCoy
vs. MoCoy,28 where, in denying the wife alimony the court said:
"Alimony is an incident of the marital relation; it may be
allowed as a part of the divorce decree; severance of the mar-
riage by a divorce decree, without alimony, terminates the right
to alimony."
3. Where the husband obtains the divorce, and alimony is
granted in a later proceeding.
The problem with which the court deals in determining
whether the ex parte divorce of the husband should cut off the
right of the wife to claim support from him thereafter is one
that immediately arouses an attitude of sympathy toward the
former wife that is not as strongly felt in the cases falling with-
in the two groups just discussed, in which groups the wife had
been the one to obtain the divorce. Even to the most cynical it
must seem unfair to permit the marriage to be destroyed by the
husband, in many cases without any actual notice to the wife
whatsoever, and then say to her that her right to seek alimony
from the husband at a later time had been lost with the de-
struction of the marriage, even though had she been present
alimony might have been granted her.
Although there is a worthy motive for broadly searching
for justice in such cases, it has proven troublesome for some
courts to work out the problem directly, and a few have taken
devious and unusual routes to reach their desired end of en-
abling the wife to maintain her action. The courts of two
states, Michigan2 9 and Wisconsin, 0 have done so by allowing
28Note 21, supra.
2, Wright v. Wright, 24 Mich. 180.3
1 Cook v. Cook, 56 Wis. 195.
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the wife, after the divorce obtained ex parte. by the husband in
another jurisdiction, to entertain an action for divorce for the
purpose of decreeing to her, as incidental thereto, alimony and
a share in her husband's property. This is, as well put by one
court, killing something already dead, as far as the divorce is
concerned, and it is hard to see why these courts did not allow
the wife simply to proceed alone for alimony, rather than pur-
sue such a roundabout course to the same end. However, the
Michigan case (Wright vs. Wright, supra) is really governed
by a statute on divorce, which names as one of the grounds of
divorce in Michigan, in the discretion of the Chancellor, the
fact that the other party had secured a divorce against a resi-
dent of Michigan in the courts of some other state. This is still
grounds for a divorce in that state.31
No such statute affected the Wisconsin case however. The
court of that state, in Cook vs. Cook,3 2 took the view that, al-
though Wisconsin does not allow an action for alimony, inde-
pendent of divorce proceedings, still where the wife was a resi-
dent of Wisconsin, and the husband secured the divorce in an-
other state by constructive service only, the status of the wife in
Wisconsin was still that of a married woman, if the Wisconsin
courts so wished to regard it, since each state has the right to
regulate the status of its own citizens, although as regards the
husband the divorce was to be considered as valid. For the pur-
pose of the present suit the wife would be regarded as a mar-
ried woman, in order that a divorce and alimony might be
granted her.33
The reasoning in two Minnesota cases,3 4 under similar cir-
"'If the Michigan courts recognized as valid divorces secured ex
parte in other jurisdictions, it would appear that about the only effect
of the statute referred to above is to allow the wife to secure alimony,
in Michigan, after such proceedings by the husband, and a simpler
way to have accomplished this would be to have provided for alimony
proceedings in such instances. The statute today is found in Comp.
Laws of Mich. 1929, Sec. 1728 (6).
'Note 30, supra.
"It may sometimes be justifiable to use this divided rem theory
in order to work out certain results that can be reached in no other
way, but it seems unsatisfactory because it necessarily leads to the
anomolous situation of looking on one of the parties as married, and
the other as divorced. Since other methods were at hand for the
court to proceed to the same conclusion, it is regrettable that it should
have adopted this unsatisfactory method of reaching its end.
"
4Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn. 279; Searles v. Searles, 140 Minn.
385.
F. L. J.-2
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cumstances, is more direct. While holding the divorce valid
as to both parties, the court allowed the wife alimony, saying
that the ex parte divorce being in rem only, is neither res
judieata, nor an estoppel, as to the question of alimony, a per-
sonal action.
Some other courts, when confronted with the problem of
the wife's petition for alimony, after the husband has obtained
a divorce based on constructive service, meet the situation by
applying the rules of practice raid down in their respective civil
codes.35
In contrast to the foregoing cases which employ such varied
routes to allow the wife alimony are those which approach the
question with the idea of abstract, metaphysical justice as the
supreme guiding light. Heading such a group of cases is Cox
vs. Coxs" an Ohio case decided in 1869. In this case the hus-
band had divorced the wife in Indiana. The wife, unaware of
the husband's divorce, later brought an action in Ohio for di-
vorce and alimony, obtaining personal service on the husabnd
there. The court, in granting her alimony, said: "In arriving
at this conclusion we make no distinction between a decree ren-
dered under the circumstances of this case in a foreign, and
one rendered in a domestic, tribunal. In either case to give to
a decree thus obtained the effect claimed for it, would be to
allow it to work a fraud upon the pecuniary rights of the wife.
Such a result, in our opinion, is rendered necessary by no prin-
35 Cralle v. Cralle, 79 Va. 182; Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212.
Here the court said: "Where the wife is before the court by personal
service she may not proceed for the first time to obtain alimony after
a final judgment in the cause and before which she did not make such
application--Campbell v. Campbell, 115 Ky. 656. This does not apply
to those cases brought before the court by constructive service only.
On the contrary, Sec. 414 of the Kentucky Civil Code of Practice pre-
scribes the method by which such non-resident defendants may re-open
a judgment within five years after its rendition, and obtain relief to
which his showing may entitle him. This section was applied in
Hughes v. Hughes, 162 Ky. 505, to a proceeding by a non-resident wife
who had been denied alimony in the prior divorce judgment obtained
by the husband."
It is regrettable that the court did not decide this case by another
method, for not much light is thrown on the situation of the wife who
might not bring her action within the five-year period prescribed by
the statute, and too, since the husband secured the ex parte divorce In
Kentucky, it Is not clear what would have been the position of the
wife had she not been the defendant, or had the divorce been secured
in some other jurisdiction.
1 19 Ohio State 502.
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eiple of comity, or public policy-the only grounds on which
ex parte decrees of divorce are authorized and supported." The
doctrine set forth in Cox vs. Cox was followed and approved in
a later Ohio case, Woods vs. Waddie.
37
An even more satisfactory decision is that of Crawforg vs.
Crawford,38 which was decided by the Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi in 1930. In this case, the husband divorced the wife in
an ex parte proceeding, the wife at the time being confined in
the state insane hospital. Service was had as provided by stat-
ute, by serving a copy of process on the superintendent of the
hospital. The wife did not appear, nor did she know of the
action. A decree of full divorce was granted the husband.
Afterward, the wife brought an action for alimony. In allow-
ing the lower court's award of alimony to stand, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi said it was of the opinion that the rule is,
that if good cause be shown for not presenting the question of
alimony at the time the decree of divorce is taken, then the
decree, under such circumstances, is not res judicata as to
alimony. To the writer, this appeals more than any other rule
as offering the best method of arriving at a true answer to 'the
problem under consideration. Such a rule tends towards an
individualizing of these cases, which is the only way in which
they should be handled.
Much earlier, in 1843, a Mississippi court had allowed the
wife alimony in a proceeding instituted after a decree of divorce
rendered against her on constructive service. This was in the
case of Shotwell vs. Slwtwell.39 In that case, Chancellor Scott,
after a lengthy discussion of English and American cases states
that the powers of the Chancery court were commensurate with
those of the Ecclesiastical Courts of England and as it was not
only allowable, but customary, for those courts to allow alimony
in a subsequent proceeding, the Chancery court should allow a
separate action for alimony, subsequent to a decree for divorce
obtained at the instance of the wife.40
"44 Ohio St. 449.58130 So..668.
"Sm. and M. Chancery 51.
" The Chancellor's analogy of the powers of the Chancery Court to
those of the Ecclesiastical Courts of England is not well drawn, since
the Ecclesiastical Courts granted only legal separations. Therefore,
alimony, In the sense that it is usually used today, that is as support
following a full divorce, was unknown. As stated in the first part of
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4. Where the husband obtains the divorce, and alimony is re-
fused in a later proceeding.
Cases falling within this group are not numerous, apparent-
ly being confined to Georgia, Illinois, and Kansas. Since a stat-
ute now controls the situation in Kansas; it can be said that this
severe way of handling the wife, divorced by the husband in
ex parte proceedings, is confined to Georgia and Illinois.
Dean Pound, in 'Interpretations of Legal History' says
that there was a persistent tendency among lawyers of the 19th
Century in England, and in America, influenced by analytical
jurisprudence and the dogma of the separation of powers, to
insist that the lawyer, and judge, and jurist had nothing to do
with ethics; that they were concerned only with a critique of
law, drawn from the law itself by an analysis of its content.
This attitude is found to be present in the decisions of the courts
above mentioned, as they approach the question of whether to
allow the wife alimony in a later proceeding, where the ex parte
divorce has been obtained by the husband. Their refusal to
allow alimony under such 'circumstances can be accounted for
in no other way.
The Georgia court's attitude on this question is in accord
with its attitude generally toward all questions arising in con-
nection with any attempt on the part of the wife to obtain
alimony, after the rendition of the decree of divorce. At least
the Georgia court exercises the virtue of consistency.
However it is more or less of a shock to find Illinois cases
in this group, as such treatment of the wife, under the circum-
stances, seems incongruous with the attitude of the courts of
this state toward her in the Karcher and Darnell cases. 41
The Kansas court has performed some juristic acrobatics in
handling this question, first holding in 1894 that a divorce, ob-
tained in Colorado by the husband after constructive service
only on the wife, barred an action by the wife in Kansas to
determine property rights, or alimony.42 However one cannot
this paper, divorces a inculo matrimonif were not granted by English
courts until after the passage of the Marriage and Divorce Act of
1857 (20 and 21 Vict. C. .28).
"Notes 14 and 15, supra.
"2 Roe v. Roe, 52 Kan. 724.
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help but feel that the court was influenced to some extent by
the facts in this case.43
Two years later this question was again before the Kansas
court, in Rodgers vs. Rodgers,44 and this time the wife was al-
lowed alimony to the extent of the homestead interest in prop-
erty in Kansas, despite the fact that the divorce the husband
had obtained in West Virginia, ex parte, purported to bar the
wife's right to property owned by the husband, the court prop-
erly holding that the West Virginia decree, dealing with prop-
erty in Kansas could have no extraterritorial effect. This hold-
ing seems, in effect, to overrule Roe vs. Roe, supra, the earlier
case.
Again in 1910 the Kansas court had this question before
it, in MoXormic vs. McCormick,45 and this time refused the
wife alimony, thus reverting to the rule pronounced in Roe vs.
Roe. This about face however was the result of a statute by then
in the Kansas Code. 46
In the Illinois ease of Hazzard vs. Hazzard,47 the husband
had obtained an ex parte divorce in 1910 on the grounds of de-
sertion. In December, 1918, the wife filed a bill for review,
alleging that William Hazzard, the husband had died, making
the appellant in this case who was the administrator of Wil-
liam Hazzard's estate the defendant. The court in a short
opinion held that where the marriage relation is broken by
death, or dissolved by divorce, the wife cannot afterward main-
tain a suit for alimony. Here again the thought occurs that
the court may have been influenced by the facts, for it could be
argued that the death of the husband, and the laches of the
"These facts are as follows: After a forced wedding in April,
1887, the husband, who was respondent above, left the day following
the marriage, going to Colorado. A child was born the following July.
The husband obtained an ex parte divorce in Colorado, and the follow-
ing year he returned to Kansas and married a Miss Perry. Seven
years later the first wife commenced her action for alimony.
"56 Kan. 483.
I82 Kan. 31.
"By Chapt. 184 of the Laws of 1907, the Kansas Legislature made
the recognition and enforcement of foreign divorce decrees, based on
publication service, the same as accorded decrees rendered by the
courts of Kansas with respect to all persons, and the status of all per-
sons affected. In McCormick v. McCormick, note 45, supra, a decree
rendered in Missouri, ex parte, was held to be as effectual as though
founded on personal service, and right to alimony was thereby barred.
17197 Ill. App. 210.
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petitioner, in addition to the severance of the marital tie by
divorce, were the deciding factors in the ]holding.
The decision in this group least beclouded by the facts on
which it is rendered is the Georgia case of Joyner vs. Joyner.4 s
The wife finding the husband in Georgia after he had obtained
a divorce in Kansas based on constructive service, instituted a
proceeding for alimony. The Supreme Court of Georgia, ap-
parently without much worry as to the pure morality of its de-
cision, made short shrift of the question by declaring that "ali-
mony will not be allowed to the wife on a separate proceeding,
after a total divorce has been granted at the instance of the
husband."
It is appropriate here, as a contrast to the Kansas statute
requiring that foreign ex parte divorce decrees be placed on
the same footing as decrees rendered in a Kansas court, to call
attention to the non-statutory rule in Pennsylvania that a de-
cree of divorce obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, upon a re-
spondent upon whom no personal service was had, and to whom
no notice was given other than by publication, has not extra-
territorial effect in Pennsylvania, and support and maintenance
proceedings will be allowed on behalf of the wife upon her find-
ing the allegedly divorced husband within that jurisdiction.49
Factors considered in fixing amount of alimony when allowed
subsequent to the decree of divorce.
Ordinarily the question as to the amount of alimony to be
given, where same is allowed subsequent to a divorce decree,
is determined in the same way that the court determines the
amount when the question is raised at the time the decree is
rendered. However, where the husband acquires additional
property subsequent to the decree of divorce the problem pre-
sents a new facet.
One line of authorities hold that after acquired property
cannot be considered in fixing the amount of alimony in such
cases,5 0 while an equally respectable group of cases are to the
effect that after acquired property may be taken into considera-
"131 Ga. 217.
Schuler v. Schuler, 2 D. C. 552 (Pa.).
Van Orsdale v. Van Orsdale, 67 Iowa 35; Cralle v. Cralle, Note 35,
sitpra.
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tion by the court in determining the amount of alimony to be
awarded.5 '
STATUTORY REGULATIONS
Other than statutes governing divorce and alimony in gen-
eral terms, few states have enacted any specific regulations that
will furnish the courts much assistance in solving the question
under consideration.
A few states have so worded their statutes governing the
award of alimony that they can be interpreted in only one
way, either as allowing alimony after divorce, or as not allowing
it. For instance, the fassachusetts statute on that subject reads
as follows: "Upon divorce, or petition at any time after divorce,
the superior court may decree alimony to the wife, or a part of
her estate in the nature of alimony to her husband."' 5 2 New
Jersey, and Rhode Island also have statutes effecting the allow-
ance of alimony after divorce decrees.
Florida has enacted a provision that alimony is unconnected
with divorce.5 3
Then there is the Michigan statute, the effect of which is
to put a resident of Michigan, after a divorce has been obtained
in another state by the other spouse, in the same position when
seeking alimony, as though the divorce had not been obtained,
for the obtaining of this divorce in the other state is a ground
for securing a divorce in Michigan by the resident thereof. 54
Kansas, as before stated, has provided by statute that a
divorce secured in any state in the United States, on construc-
tive service, shall have the same force as though the decree had
been rendered in a Kansas court.55
Undoubtedly legislation in this field is beneficial _nly ag it
tends to individualize each case. Certainty is not a particularly
desired end. For that reason legislation is helpful only in those
jurisdictions whose courts have felt their free approach to this
question burdened by the doctrines of res jud1'oata, the in-
separableness of divorce and alimony, etc. No criticism is meant
51Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476; Cox v. Cox, 20 Ohio St. 439;
Searles v. Searles, Note 34, supra.
"Massachusetts Gen. Stats. 1921, C. 208, Sec. 34.
Florida Code, See. 3196.
Comp. Laws of Michigan 1929, Sec. 1278 (6).
Revised Stats. of Kansas, Sec. 107-1518.
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of the decisions in which these concepts are put forward-much
is to be said in favor of the correctness of their application-
but certainly courts should be freed of such mechanical impedi-
ments to a desired end by legislative aid if they have not felt
that they could dispose of such obstacles themselves.
CONCLUSION
There is some evidence of the development of the desired
rule of individualization to be found in the decisions. The em-
bryonic beginning of such a rule is seen in Eldred vs. Eldred,50
where in refusing a petition for alimony the Nebraska court,
in 1901, distinguished the facts in this case from those in an
earlier Nebraska case57 where alimony had been granted by
pointing out that in the earlier case the husband had been the
one to obtain the divorce. Thus whether the husband or the
wife had been the one to obtain the divorce makes the decision
depend, at least to that extent, on the facts.58 We find this
distinction again made in a Tennessee case 59 decided in 1925,
and apparently this distinction is still the rule in that jurisdic-
tion.
In 1930, in the case of Crawuford vs. Crawford,6o the supreme
court of Mississippi held in effect that while good cause must
be shown as to why the claim for alimony was not presented at
the time the decree was taken, if such cause can be shown then
the petition for alimony will be examined on its merits. Such
treatment of the problem practically reaches the stage of in-
dividualization, and thus makes for a surer way of arriving at
a just decision than does the mechanical application of judicial
rules, which sometimes blinded the courts to the abstract justice
involved in this question.
Note 24, supra.
Cochrane v. Cochrane, 42 Nebr. 61.
This distinction no longer made in Nebrasxa. Wife now allowed
to obtain alimony after ex parte divorce even though she had been
complainant in divorce proceedings. See Bodie v. Bates, 95 Nebr. 757.
5 Darby v. Darby, Note 21, supra.
"Crawford v. Crawford, 130 So. 688.
